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COMMENTS i
NEWS PHOTOGRAPHS AND THE COURTS-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In the case of In re: Attachmeni for Contempt of Mack et al., 386
Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was squarely
confronted with a conflict of mounting perplexity in recent years: the relation
between the right to a fair trial and the right to a free press. With the modern
methods and improved techniques now being utilized by the press, this problem
has taken on new and vast dimensions. The instant case represents the first
appellate venture of any jurisdiction into the question of whether a rule of
court may go beyond the immediate area of the courtroom in prohibiting the
press from taking photographs of criminal defendants.
Seven newspapermen were convicted of criminal contempt for their part
in taking pictures of a defendant in a' much publicized murder trial.' The
pictures were taken in direct defiance of an express judicial prohibition against
such photographs.' Several were obtained prior to the defendant's appearing
before the court for sentencing, at a distance of thirty-five feet from the court-
room entrance, situated on the fourth floor of the courthouse. Others were
taken on the first floor, as the defendant Was being led back to the county jail
after sentence had been passed. All the photographs were taken by means of a
small, unobstrusive, noiseless camera concealed on the person of the photo-
grapher. No commotion or disturbance resulted. The appellants contended
that the rule of court represented an attempt to censor the public press without
justifiable grounds, in -violation of the state and federal constitutions.' In
dismissing this contention, the Supreme Court held that civil liberties are neither
absolute nor unlimited. Where a particular rule of court results in a partial
abridgement of the right to a free press, it becomes the duty of the court to
weigh the relative merits of the respective conflicting interests. The instant
rules represented an attempt to preserve the dignity of the court, and the
'Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d 334 (1955). The murder trial of the
much publicized "Turnpike Phantom Killer."
2 WESTMORELAND COUNTY CT, RULE 6084, which prohibits, inter alia, the photographing
of any prisoner on his way to or from a session of court, and the taking of photographs in any
place within forty feet of the entrance to any courtroom.
3 PA. Comm5r., Art. I, § 7 (1874); U. S. CONST. Amend XIV. The fundamental concept of
liberty :embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the privileges and immunities guaran-
teed by the First Amendment, including Freedom of the Press. Pennekamp v. Florida 328 U.S.
331 (1940); Cantell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
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orderly administration of justice. So long as these rules bear a "reasonable"
relation to this expressed aim, they are both proper and valid.
However, at this point the court seemed to summarily dismiss as decided
the question thus raised: was there in fact such a reasonable relationship?
For they stated: "Therefore, whether or not freedom of the press is here
involved is immaterial, since such freedom is subject to reasonable rules .... " '
They chose rather, to rely on their evaluation of the utility of the photographs
taken. They concluded that the only purpose the photographs could serve is
to satisfy the sadistic instincts of a large segment of the public. Courthouses
are not to be made the source of such entertainment.
It was further added that if the appellant's present contention was upheld,
the court would have no power to prohibit the taking of pictures within the
courtrooms.
Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was the subject
of the court by virtue of judicial process, and not volitionally. Therefore, the
court was charged with the duty of protecting his individual right of privacy.
Notwithstanding the fact that he had been convicted of first degree murder,
and sentenced to die in the electric chair, he was nevertheless the "ward of
the court" who must be protected from these infringements upon his rights.
The genesis of the rules presently under attack, and of similar rules of a
less restrictive nature, can be traced to the bitter resentment occasioned over the
circus-like atmosphere that encompassed the Bruno Hauptmann trial in 1935. G
The American Bar Association became aroused and incensed by what they felt
to be a deplorable spectacle of complete lack of decorum and orderly adminis-
tration in the conduct of a judicial proceeding. As a result they adopted Canon
35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which provides:'
"Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and de-
corum. The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the
court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings
are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade
the court, distract the witness in giving his testimony, and create misconceptions
with respect thereto, in the mind of the public and should not be permitted."
4 Page 4 of mimeographed copy of decision, prepared by the office of the Prothonotary of
the Supreme Court. The official reporter citations had not been released at the date of this
writing.
5 Heretofore, the right of privacy had not been judicially recognized in a Pennsylvania ap-
pellate court. Harlow et ux v. Buno Co. Inc., 36 Pa. D.&C. 101 (1939); Clayman v. Bern-
stein, 38 Pa. D.&C. 543 (1940); see also the concurring opinion of Justice Maxey in Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Station Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ad. 631 (1937).6 State of New Jersey v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 At. 809 (1935), the murder
trial of the notorious Lindbergh child kidnapper. The entire proceedings were conducted amid
exploding flashbulbs, glaring Kleig lights, with witnesses and court officers tripping over the
maze of electric wires, and members of the press swarming throughout the courtroom at will.
7 62 A.B.A. REP. 861 (1937), amended to include television in 1952.
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Upon its adoption, Canon 35 met with widespread approval. Seemingly over-
night, it became the subject of a judicial crusade. This fact can be demonstrated
by the adoption in many jurisdictions, both federal and state, of a rule of
similar effect embodying the substance of the canon." Perhaps the most signifi-
cant of these was the United States Supreme Court.' The rule adopted by this
most highly respected court restricted the prohibition, as did Canon 35, to the
confines of the courtroom. Accordingly, it would seem that the Canon, and
the many rules of court resulting therefrom, can hardly be cited as authority
for an extension as great as that met in the instant case. Rather, it is illustrative
of rules deemed necessary and proper to insure the decorum of the court and
the judicious disposition of the court's business. One may well wonder that
if more limitations on the press were deemed necessary to "properly" secure
that purpose, it would have been so provided.
Fundamentally, the problem grows out of the fact that the various privi-
leges guaranteed by the constitution are not entirely unrelated, unrestrained or
absolute."° Frequently they conflict with one another." As a result, it becomes
the duty of the court to weigh the conflicting interests and, to whatever extent
possible, seek a balance. But for a true conflict to exist, there must be an area
in which the rights overlap. A prerequisite to restricting one right is an in-
fringement upon another. In the present situation, there are two evils that
must be avoided: first, the rights granted to the press may be unnecessarily
invaded under a guised purpose of insuring the defendant a fair trial; secondly,
the latter right may be partially denied under the cry of "free press".
News photographs have become an integral and essential part of news
reporting. As such, they are a constituent element of freedom of the press.!"
But on the other hand, a court in maintaining the decorum of proceedings and
the orderly administration of justice is preserving the constitutional and un-
alienable right of all persons to a fair trial. All extraneous influences and
distractions which tend, or may tend, to deny a litigant of this right should
be eliminated, by way of rule of court or otherwise. 18 So long as the rule bears
a reasonable relation to the accomplishment of this aim, there is no unjustified
interference with the freedom of the press. The Supreme Court recognized
8 37 J. AM. JUD. SoC'Y. 166 (1954).
9 FED. R. CiuM. P. 53.
10 United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946); Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395 (1952); Fitzgerald v. City of Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1954);
Wortex Mills Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 339 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1940).
11 Amer. Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1949).
12 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Superior Films Inc. v. Dept. of Education, State
of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
Is Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 At. 312; State of Ohio v. Clifford et al., 162 Ohio 370,




this, and they posed it as being the -test to be applied.14 But in searching the
opinion, it is difficult to see that they applied it. Instead, they chose to rely
on other grounds, in which there are, in this writer's opinion, no solid founda-
tions of reason or precedent.
One ground given for the decision was that this type of news photograph
has no informative value whatsoever, and only tends to supply sensationalism.
Moreover, they added that courthouses are not maintained for the purpose of
supplying the public with entertainment. In so deciding, it would seem that
the court was setting up some arbitrary dividing line between the informing
aspect and the entertaining aspect, based on their own personal evaluations.
Seemingly such a line approaches censorship. As was most aptly stated by the
United States Supreme Court
"The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right [a free press] . . . What is one man's amuse-
ment teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any possible
value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection
of a free press as the best of literature." "
As another ground, the court said that if photographs were. permitted to
be taken outside the courtroom, they then would be powerless to prevent them
from invading the courtroom. To support this contention is indeed a difficult
task. The opposite result has obviously been reached by the many courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, which have adopted a rule
of court embodying the content of Canon 35, which prohibits photographs only
within the courtroom. Moreover, if the criterion for any prohibition is that
previously mentioned, there would be no such lack of power.
Finally, the court held the rule to be valid for the reason that all courts
are charged with the duty of safeguarding a defendant's individual tight of
privacy. Apparently they felt that the instant rule was consistent with such a
duty. This seems to be in direct conflict with all the authorities on the subject.
The applicable law repeatedly and unequivocally states that where one becomes
identified with an occurrence of legitimate public interest, he emerges from his
protected seclusion. When this results, there is no invasion of his right of
privacy when his likeness is published, along with an accurate account of the
occurrence.16 This established principle was recently recognized by this same
14 Page 5 of decision, supra note 4.
1 5
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1945).
18 Berg v. Minneapolis Star &,Tribune, 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.C. Minn. 1954) (party to a civil
action); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (App._D.C. 1946) (accused criminal); Estell v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951) (prosecuting attorney); Martin v. Dorton,
210 Miss. 668, 50 So.2d 391 (1951) (sheriff); Thermo v. New England Newspaper Co., 306 Mass.
54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940)); In re Seed, 1.40 Misc, 681, 251 N.Y.Supp. 615 (1931); 41 AM.
JUR. 923; RsrsATMN NT, ToRrs § 867 (1934).
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court in Schnabel v. Meredith.7 Here the plaintiff brought an action for libel
and invasion of right of privacy in the alternative. This was founded on a
newspaper article published by the defendant, which referred to slot machines
found on the plaintiff's property. Previously the plaintiff had been acquitted
of any offence in connection with the illegal machines. In affirming a compul-
sory non-suit against the plaintiff, the Supreme Court stated:
. . . Assuming, without deciding, that such a right does exist in Penn-
sylvania, the appellant has not brought himself within the operation of the
rules governing the right of privacy where such right has been judicially recog-
nized. The appellant would hardly assert that at the time the slot machines
were found on his property, it was an unreasonable interference with his privacy
to disclose that fact to the various news dispersing media. It is beyond question
that at the time, his activities were a legitimate matter for public inquiry-and
that is so whether the appellant came willingly or unwillingly into public
notice." (Emphasis added.)
The court in substantiating the application of a right of privacy in the
instant case, gave as a reason that persons found guilty on criminal charges
have later been found to be innocent. With this startling thought in mind,
it is difficult to realize that this identical court affirmed the conviction which
sent the defendant to die in the electric chair."8
Notwithstanding the complete lack of authority, there is still another factor
that may have been overlooked by the court. In upholding the rule restraining
the press, and the contempt conviction for its violation, they are using as a basis
the purely personal right of privacy. Since this is solely a civil remedy, any
abuse is strictly compensatory in character.
The net effect of the present decision, aside from introducing a question-
able precedent into the subject of right of privacy, is to extensively enlarge
the area of limitations of the press in taking photographs from the courtroom
to the entire courthouse. Moreover, by imposing the duty on all courts, it is
substituting the individual trial court's discretion with a blanket mandatory
prohibition. In so deciding, it would seem that the court's rationale loses sight
of the purpose, right, and reason for the limitations placed on the rights of the
press: "to preserve the constitutional and unalienable right of all persons to
a fair trial, and to bar any impediments in the orderly administration of
justice." The broad issue in every case of alleged infringement of the right
to a free press is whether the acts or words of the press are of such a nature
as to create a "clear and present" danger that they will bring about the sub-
17 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860. See 59 DICK. L. REv. 232.
is See note I supra.
1957.)
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stantive evil that the court has the right to prevent."0 To go beyond this is to
vitiate the very purpose of the First Amendment, which is to foreclose public
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulation
of the press, speech, and religion.20
This writer does not subscribe to the conclusion that the instant rule of
court, and the affirmation of the contempt conviction which followed its viola-
tion, might not have been upheld by applying the criterion advanced herein.
Rather, it is the rationale and resulting net effect which are being questioned.
Whether an act is likely to bring about danger of substantive evil, sufficient
to justify impairing the rights of the press, is a question of proximity and
degree that cannot be completely captured in a formula or test. The activities
of the press can become extremely destructive to the rights of an accused and to
the proper exercise of the court's machinery. The many and varied possible
considerations are far beyond the scope of this comment. They are individual
considerations which should be left to the individual trial courts, and cannot
be dealt with by blanket prohibition applicable to all. The right of appeal
would provide the normal safeguards for any abuse. It seems entirely reason-
able that one rule might be appropriate for a small courthouse in a rural county,
while the same rule might be unreasonable and invalid for a court located in a
large building in the heart of a metropolitan area. This is but one example
of many factors to be considered.
From a practical standpoint, the instant decision proceeds in the opposite
direction from achieving the end to which the conflict between the press and
the courts may be resolved. It will undoubtedly arouse resentment among the
press to an even higher pitch, and only bring about evasive measures. The
press will continue their cry of "free press", and the courts will solemnly
answer "fair trial". It would seem that the answer does not lie in repeated
judicial clashes to determine which interest will prevail in any given situation.
Instead, it is contended that the more desirable, although more difficult, pro-
cedure is through concrete effort to achieve some sort of legal-journalistic unity.
Such a suggestion has received favorable responses from prominent lawyers,
judges, and newspapermen alike." Recently the New York County Lawyers
Association, the largest local bar association in the country, took steps along
19 Bridges v. California 314 U.S. 367 (1940); Thomas v. Collins 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); See Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials,
63 HRv. L. REv. 840, 850 (1950). The instant rule is similar to a prior restraint on publication
which is jusified only where there is a clear and present danger which will cause a substantive evil.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
20 Thomas v. Collins, supra Note 19.
21 19 F.R.D. 16 (1956); 63 A.B.A. REP. 384 (1938); 37 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 75 (1953);
New York Times, Aug. 26, 1953; Dallas Morning News, Aug. 25, 1953; Christian Science Mon-
itor, Aug. 28, 1953.
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these lines by formulating a Proposed Code on Fair Trial and Free Press to be
adopted by both professions.2 Only by moves such as this, with a common
unified objective, will the conflict be resolved.
As was most appropriately stated by one writer: 8
"A large slice of reasonableness, garnished with a hefty touch of realism,
can go far in solving this problem of highest importance, not only to the two
professions, but to our American Society as well."
CARL F. BARGER.
2 37 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 75 (1953).
28 Marcus D. Gleissner in 3 CLEV-MAR. L. Rnv. 123 (1956).
